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ABSTRACT
Set against the backdrop of the British Government’s Future
Reserves 2020 (FR2020) programme, this article addresses military
reservists’ experiences of how they are perceived by civilian col-
leagues in the workplace. Drawing on qualitative interviews with
reservists, it analyses their understandings of civilian co-workers’
qualified and sometimes reluctant acceptance in light of FR2020’s
implicit aim to use reservists to help realign civil–military relation-
ships. While it appears that civilian work colleagues’ social distan-
cing of reservists helps consolidate the wider public’s perceived
lack of understanding of the British armed forces, a more critical
view sees reservists’ largely unchallenged presence in the work-
place as an exemplary, yet subtle instance of militarization. This is
because reservists’ simultaneous (physical) inclusion and (social)
distancing or stigmatization constitutes, and is constitutive of,
their need to pass as civilian. In conclusion, we argue that a key
implication of their passing as civilian is to neutralize debate of the
legitimacy – or otherwise – of the armed forces as an institution
tasked with violence on behalf of the state.
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Introduction
While opinion polling in the UK suggests consistent and enduring public support for
the armed forces at the macro level, little is known of the everyday experiences of
reservists in civilian employment contexts. Yet, this is important because how civilian
colleagues perceive a co-worker’s military role may influence how reservists approach
their part-time career in the armed forces (Dandeker, Greenberg, and Orme 2011). Set
against the backdrop of the UK Armed Forces Future Reserves (FR2020) programme,
and drawing on qualitative research interviews which elicited insights from reservists
around how they are seen by colleagues, this article explores the consequences of
military actors’ presence in the civilian employment context. Specifically, we focus on
the potential role of reservists in realigning civil–military relationships – sometimes
conceptualized as a ‘gap’ – through educating colleagues about their reservist role. This
line of enquiry has been animated by one of the rationales of FR2020, that a renewed
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visibility and expansion of reservists might facilitate civilians’ better understanding of
the armed forces. This article, however, is also alert to a more critical perspective of
FR2020 which sees it as a further instance of the militarization of the UK through
attempts to normalize the military in a key sector of everyday life, employment (Walton
2014). The article develops a critical military studies (CMS) approach in problematizing
rather than taking military power for granted (Basham and Gifkins 2015; Eastwood
2018), focussing on the micro-social and political contestation of military actors in the
civilian workplace, and asking how far and in what kinds of ways reservists can be seen
as vectors of militarization. Our analytical focus is on the potentially productive
tensions between reservists’ simultaneous workplace exclusion as exceptional military
actors, and inclusion as civilians. Importantly, it draws on experiences reported by
reservists themselves.
The article is structured as follows. After discussing the concepts of militarism and
militarization, we provide an overview of FR2020 and introduce the methodology. We
then examine how reservists believe they are regarded by civilians in the workplace as
military actors of a particular kind. Discussion of how our military participants’
identities were discredited by civilian co-workers in ways that chime with Erving
Goffman’s (1963) concept of stigma, or spoilt identity, follows. In response, reservists
demonstrated a good deal of spontaneous reflexivity and creativity in presenting
civilianized selves that balanced both distance and familiarity with colleagues. Key to
our analysis and wider argument is a recognition that it is in the fertile interstices
between reservists’ physical proximity yet simultaneous social distance from civilians
that militarization is manifest. We conclude with a discussion of what we term ‘the
militarist dividend’.
Context and concepts: militarism and militarization
Militarism and militarization continue to constitute and be expressed within the UK’s
political, economic, social, and cultural life. Examples range from the size and profile of the
arms/defence industry (Stavrianakis 2012a) to the global proliferation of the British private
military and security industry (Kinsey 2006), the ubiquity of military signs, symbols, and
heritage sites in public spaces (Woodward 2005), mainstream media’s general tendency to
support military action (Brown 2003), the regularity with which the armed forces are
deployed to fight (Dixon 2018), the relative lack of resistance to so-called wars of choice
(Hill 2016) and the dominant, largely demilitarized ways that Britain’s imperial history is
framed as almost entirely beneficent for those ‘in need of civilizing’ (Gott 2011). Militarism
and militarization are paradoxical, though; for example, alongside popular support for the
UK armed forces, we see ongoing recruitment difficulties and waning support for the idea
of overseas military intervention. A wealth of recent scholarship seeking to define and
explain the causes and consequences of militarism and militarization has burgeoned across
disciplines as diverse as international relations (Stavrianakis and Selby 2012), human
geography (Woodward 2005; Rech et al. 2015), feminist studies (Enloe 2000; Stern and
Zalewski 2009; Mohanty 2011; Åhäll 2016; Wibben 2018) criminology (Kraska 2007; Salter
2014; Evans 2017), sociology (Shaw 1991; Martino 2012; McSorley 2012) and, of most
relevance to the current article, CMS (Enloe 2015; Agathangelou 2017; Massé, Lunstrum,
and Holterman 2017). Broadening and deepening formulations of militarism derived from
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earlier literatures (Liebknecht and Sirnis 1972), allied work has identified the spatially and
temporally diffuse character of militarization (Hyde 2016) that can play out at the level of
everyday commodities (Turse 2008; Jackson 2017) and assume both subtle and hidden
forms (Giroux 2004; Kallender andHughes 2018).While militarism has typically been used
to invoke the means by which societies may glorify or celebrate war (Vagts 1959; Shaw
1991), militarization focuses on the translation of these ideologies into material, discursive,
and processual practices (Enloe 2002; Flusty et al. 2008). Explorations of militarism and
militarization have sought, for example, to understand how military forces become identi-
fied as the ultimate resolver of tensions, that having enemies is a natural condition, that
societies are predisposed to conflict, and that a state without a military is weak (Enloe 2002,
23–4). Critics have asked why values closely associated with military identity, such as
loyalty, honour, conformity, and obedience, come to be privileged and framed as desirable
for civilians and as panacea to particular kinds of social problems (Lutz 2009, 184;
Bernazzoli and Flint 2009, 401). The agency of individuals engaged directly with processes
which may be identified as militarizing has also elicited interest (Woodward, Jenkings, and
Williams 2017; Enloe 2000) as has the indifference of some social actors to militaristic
ideologies and the value to others of the state’s maintenance of security capabilities and its
role in the security–development nexus (Duffield 2014; Duncanson and Woodward 2015).
By inference, militarization in its more obviously commodified forms (the Pentagon’s links
with Hollywood come to mind here; see Boggs 2015), might be conceived of not as
straightforwardly problematic, but rather as an unintended consequence of an economic
system whose logics transcend wider ethical consideration prioritizing the use of military
force over other means.
Here, we move forward from an understanding that the circulation of ideas and
beliefs around the superiority or inferiority of militarized values is most usefully
conceptualized as an assemblage comprised of co-existing military and civilian ways
of seeing, feeling, and acting that complicates the apparently discrete division between
the two (Enloe 2002; Bernazzoli and Flint 2009, 399; Basham 2018; Howell 2018). In
this view, militarization gains cultural, political, and economic traction because it is
‘already there’ as the ‘in-between’ (Basham and Gifkins 2015, 1), and many contem-
porary phenomena are always and already a product of the assemblage (Woodward,
Jenkings, and Williams 2017). In taking this understanding further, Howell (2018)
argues that liberal society is shaped by war-like relations that eschew the civil–military
‘divide’ altogether. In this article, rather than talking of a civil–military binary we
conceptualize the field as a complex of civil–military relationships, where a ‘divide’ or
‘gap’ is understood as having discursive rather than analytic reality. Ultimately, bringing
the permeable, fluid, and dynamic military–civilian interface into sharp relief allows us
to better understand the everyday identity challenges faced by reservists as they move
across these imbricated worlds. It is also a necessary undertaking. As individuals
associated with an institutional raison d’etre around the use of state-legitimated lethal
violence, there is a specificity (or ‘need to be different’; Dandeker 2000) to military
personnel that some might equate with moral superiority. It is, then, perhaps unsur-
prising that those providing this unique public good – nested in the use of violence and
invoking questions of life and death – might be accorded a somewhat ambivalent status
by colleagues in the civilian workplace.
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Context: the Future Reserves 2020 programme
All three services in the UK armed forces have reservist traditions, though their origins and
histories vary. Of these, the Army’s long-established former Territorial Army (TA) was by
far the most well known. Despite some of their number deploying to the Balkans following
the break-up of Yugoslavia and consequent involvement in the Gulf War in 2003, invest-
ment in the TA declined against the backdrop of the so-called Cold War peace dividend.
However, UK defence reforms, combined with public-sector funding stringencies in the
years following the 2008 financial crisis and significant political pressures lobbying for a
maintained UK reservist capability (see Edmunds et al. 2016; Bury 2018), set in train plans
for Reserves reform. Under the FR2020 programme, and following considerable consulta-
tion, the reforms aimed to create a trained strength of 34,900 including 30,000 in a new
Army Reserve, 3100 in the Royal Navy Reserve and Royal Marines Reserve, and 1800 in the
Royal Auxiliary Air Force. Reservists were seen as being flexible additions to the UK armed
forces, and cost efficient. These reforms chimed with the then Coalition Government’s
ideological emphasis on the ‘Big Society’ and its ethos of volunteering and civic responsi-
bility. More broadly, themove reflected similar changes taking place in reserve forces across
Europe, North America, and Australia.
Three related developments within the reserves are worth highlighting. First, the UK saw
actual deployment and absence from civilian work of reservists to theatres of wars in Iraq
(2003–2011) and Afghanistan (2001–2014), followed by their subsequent return to work.
Second, there was a concerted effort by successive governments to increase the awareness
and support of the civilian population towards the work of the armed forces. To these ends
the Report of Inquiry into National Recognition of our Armed Forces (Davies, Clark, and
Sharp 2008) advocated policies to enhance personnel’s visibility in the media and in public
life. The idea of an armed forces covenant and its realization as an organizational phenom-
enon also emerged, enhancing defence visibility in some parts of the public sector, and
successive defence relationship management schemes (currently the Employer Recognition
Scheme) promoted reserves visibility explicitly to employers. Third, an increased reliance
upon reservists and their greater integration with regulars and the private sector through
the Whole Force Concept required more direct engagement with some employers and
workforces. In other words, there has been considerable realignment of civil–military
relationships, shaping the civilian workplaces of reservists. However, little is known
about the practical realities and consequent management of reservist social interactions
through which workplaces are experienced by reservists.
FR2020 and reservists’ proximity as ‘outward facing’?
In its early iterations, it was hoped that FR2020 might lead to more developed forms of
civil–military understanding, presenting the ‘face’ of the British military to civilian
communities and populations (Dandeker, Greenberg, and Orme 2011, 349). It was
imagined that an enhanced, vibrant, outward-facing reserve contingent would some-
what organically disseminate military values through the vector of the soldier-civilian.
In this sense, to be outward facing is to be proximate to the civilian beneficiaries for
whom learning more of the military and its ways is regarded in positive terms. While it
could be argued that this informal reservist role existed primarily in rhetorical form, it
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is nevertheless something of an enduring theme over many decades in policy discus-
sion. As the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) White Paper argued, ‘Perhaps more
importantly, at a time when memories of National Service are fading, the network of
TA units and drill halls provides an important link between the armed forces and the
wider community’ (Dodd and Oakes 1998, 46–7).
The FR2020 consultation document Reserves 2020: The Independent Commission to
Review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces (MoD 2011) contained a series of claims
around support for an armed forces generally held in high regard by the host popula-
tion (Gribble et al. 2014), but which was felt to flow from ‘sympathy’ rather than
‘understanding’ (MoD 2011, 10). What was required was a ‘strategic narrative … to re-
establish popular understanding of Defence and the rationale for the Nation’s Reserves’
(MoD 2011, 11). It is reasoned that through their sheer presence, as if by osmosis, the
values of armed forces personnel would seep into the consciousness of their host
society, and that reservists would exert a default positive influence on the civilians
with whom they interact on a daily basis.
FR2020: reservist proximity and militarization
The renewed focus on and reinvigoration of the new Army Reserve in the updated form of
FR2020 has been read by critical commentators as a retrograde step, representing a further
instance of the militarization of British society.1 Seen in this critical register, policies are
viewed as deepening and broadening wider existing militarizing tendencies that include the
granting of £40,000 bursaries to veterans whowish to train as teachers (Ward 2018), the focus
on ‘military ethos’ as a valorized set of values aimed at young people, military ‘free schools’,
the Invictus Games involving former service people who were injured in recent conflicts and
are celebrated in their ability to overcome adversity, and the shift from remembrance to
celebration of those who have served, or who are currently on active service (Walton 2014;
Basham 2016). FR2020 has received particular attentionwithin this wider critique. Concern is
expressed by critical commentators that the reserve forces have the ‘potential to strengthen…
support for the military from society’ (Walton 2014, 9). Echoing points made above, the
Quaker-authored report goes on to argue that a key rationale for FR2020 is the lack of public
understanding of themilitary that might be addressed by the ‘propaganda effectiveness’ of the
reserves (Walton 2014, 9). Here, an initiative intended to play a modest role in strengthening
civil–military relations is read through a rather more sceptical lens as a further instance of
militarization, replete with its ideologically nuanced character (Eastwood 2018). The Defence
Employer Recognition Scheme, noted above, ‘encourages employers to support defence and
inspire others to do the same’ through a gold, silver, or bronze award aimed at private- and
public-sector organizations encouraging employee participation in the Reserves. Taken
together, then, formalized workplace policies oriented at managing the demands of reserve
service through, and a pro-active stance towards, the armed forces underscore the militariza-
tion of the employers in question if we read these practices as ‘being caught up in and
influenced by military ways’ (Eastwood 2018: 46). Yet whether FR2020 is seen as either
positive or negative in regard to its wider impact is contingent on the evidence for precisely
how these actors are perceived by colleagues. How far are they distanced or included in the
workplace by colleagues on account of their reservist status?
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Researching the reserves
This paper is based on qualitative empirical data collected for the Keeping Enough in Reserve
(KEiR) project, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the
Ministry of Defence (MoD) and part of the Future Reserves Research Programme (FRRP).
The project was approved by MoD research ethics processes, and all publications and key
findings were shared with the MoD as part of wider policy discussions, with the researchers
retaining full intellectual freedom in disseminating the research. KEiR investigated how
reservists negotiate the different commitments and pressures they face within their civilian
jobs and their reserve unit work. We were particularly interested in their experiences within
the workplace as this has been most affected by the changes in the reservist commitment. We
did not speak to civilians about their perceptions of the military reserve as that was the focus
of other projects within the wider FRRP (see Basham and Catignani 2018). The MoD does
collect information about these concerns in its annual Armed Forces Continuous Attitude
(AFCAS) although the statistical data yielded from surveymethods of this kind leaves a gap in
understanding around the subjectivities, experiences, and life-worlds of participants, material
that emerges with more detail, depth, and nuance in qualitative research and which has been
absent in much work in military sociology (Jenkings et al. 2010).
In order to examine the particular experiences and perceptions of reservists, we conducted
two-stage, in-depth interviews and focus groups with individuals, including both men and
women, serving in different reserve units across the Army, Navy, and Royal Air Force (RAF).
Access was sought through top-down introductions to units followed by local negotiations
with unit commanders. Participants were provided with a project information leaflet and
consent form which was discussed in depth prior to starting. Participation was voluntary and
the need to protect the anonymity of the participants means it is not possible to provide too
much detail about the individual biographies of participants in published outputs. The
research was conducted in two distinct regions of the UK: the South West around Bristol
and the North East around Tyneside. We left a 12-month gap between the first and second
interviews and, of the 53 interviewed in the first round (10 Royal Navy, nine RAF, and 24
Army), we were able to interview 25 in the second round as some people hadmoved on from
the reserve, were deployed, or were unwilling to continue participating in the research. In the
first stage of the interview process four to six people were interviewed in each unit, consisting
of service equivalents of one commissioned officer, one senior non-commissioned officer,
one junior non-commissioned officer and at least one private. We conducted nine focus
groups, five in the South West (four Army and one Royal Marine units), and four in the
North West (all Army). We also conducted a number of interviews with Human Resource
(HR) Directors in different employer organizations, including the Police and the National
Health Service (NHS). The interviews and focus groups were recorded and the transcribed
data was coded and analysed according to emerging themes using NVivo. A key theme
reported by reservists concerned the ways they were perceived by colleagues, the analysis of
which we turn to next.
Findings: stigma and managing identity
With some notable exceptions and allied caveats, reservists believed that they were
generally accepted in the workplace. However, disclosing one’s role as a reservist was
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not necessarily straightforward and frequently invoked social distance, with one
reservist even saying ‘I did make … a mistake in telling them what I did … it was
the biggest learning curve’. Others reported colleagues’ wariness towards them and,
at certain moments, outright hostility. These observations are important to the
project’s overall line of enquiry around reservists’ negotiation of military and civilian
identities where we take their stigmatization as a potentially insightful point of
departure. When confronted with negative responses in the workplace, reservists
enacted various derivatives of what Goffman (1963) describes as passing, a concept
that refers to the social tactics individuals use to manage a discredited or stigmatized
aspect of their spoilt identity. One reading of Goffman is to see reservists’ qualified
disclosure – where only certain information about their role is conveyed – as an
attempt at inclusion:
The issue is not that of managing tension generated during social contacts, but rather that
of managing information about this failing. To display or not to display; to tell or not to
tell; to let on or not to let on; to lie or not to lie; and in each case, to whom, how, when,
and where. (Goffman 1963, 42)
Unlike the ways the concept was developed by Goffman and taken up in subsequent years,
its use here concerns an identity that can be, or perhaps is more usually, hidden, such that
reservists have a greater latitude around whether or not to ‘come out’ as members of the
armed forces. This is a question of reservists’ information management shaped ‘not only by
the threat of stigmatization but also by concerns of authenticity [as ‘real’ soldiers], legiti-
macy [the politics of military service] and exceptionality [as ‘not’ civilian]’ (Clair, Beatty,
and Maclean 2005, 79). Challenges to reservist identity were faced in myriad ways and at
certain moments invoked wounded masculinity presented in traditional, militarized forms
(Arkin and Dobrofsky 1978; Hockey 1986; Barrett 1996; Higate 2003; Belkin 2012). For
many, managing similarity and difference remained an everyday dilemma and was often
negotiated through controlling precisely what participants would divulge about their
reservist activities. Invoking an explicitly masculine trope around patriotism, one female
reservist said, ‘whenmy friends invite me out on a Tuesday [I can’t say] I’m going to “serve
my country” … and that is what it is to them’. Rationales varied for why participants might
not choose to disclose their reservist role, with the question of how far ‘civilians’ would be
presumed to ‘understand the life’ discussed by another reservist. One participant said ‘no
one really gets it … apart from my house mates … unless you’re part of it you won’t
understand’. Both comments hint at the exceptional character of the masculinized soldier
figure that required careful management – in these cases, suppression and thus social
distance from colleagues.
Civilian misunderstanding of the reservist role: creating distance
Colleagues and the significant others of reservists expressed varying degrees of knowl-
edge of their voluntary military activities. Perceptions ranged from a sense of the reality
of their role through to its mythologized and caricatured dimensions. In terms of the
former, one participant stated that ‘most of my colleagues “get it” … they understand’,
whereas in the latter, another complained that his wife didn’t think ‘it’ [the reserves]
‘was a job’. This theme was continued when a focus group participant recalled what he
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saw as his wife’s feminization of the physical hardship he endured through the flippant
question ‘“are you going camping this weekend?”’ As Dandeker, Greenberg, and Orme
(2011, 352) note: ‘family and friendship networks may provide less of a buttress against
indifference or even hostility from some quarters in civilian society whose support of
the operations to which reservists have deployed may be lacking’.
Reservists suggested that civilians’ misunderstanding could be explained by their
‘lack of contact with the military … they’ve never been … interested in it themselves …
they don’t really care’, a statement that further invokes the organization’s distance from
its host society. It was only when reservists were deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan
that colleagues’ misconceptions about the reality of their role became apparent. One
participant said, ‘they wind us up’ and ‘when Iraq was kicking off they would say “oh,
you’ll be off there next!”’. The reservist continued, ‘when I got me [sic] brown envelope
through the door they were like “oh, she’s really going”’. A number of reservists
experienced difficulty in ‘relaying what we’ve done … when we’ve been away’ and at
times, trying to explain could engender boredom for reservist and civilian alike. The
participant went on to say, ‘I gave up trying to explain [to work colleagues] … what it’s
about’. Framed sarcastically, other colleagues would ask him if he was ‘going in the
army this weekend?’ to which the reservist replied with a terse ‘Yes’. One’s role as a
reservist could also be distanced through being mistaken for something quite different.
For example, one participant recounted a particular example as he left his house, ‘I
stepped out [wearing] white belt and brasses … and some of my medals and a female
neighbour said “I didn’t know you were in the cadets!”’ This example in particular hints
at a wounded masculine pride turning on infantilization in the case of being identified
as a cadet, and was immediately countered with ironic imagery invoking hypermascu-
linity. An archaic reading of gender also produced a degree of alienation in the case of
another participant who said of work colleagues ‘no, they’re not interested [in the
reserves] … most of them [colleagues] are women, so it’s not their thing’. He believed
that their interests diverged sharply and involved wanting to ‘go out and drink all the
time, party, whatever they do on weekends’. In continuation of belittling through
feminizing, another of the sample said ‘people nowadays are interested in being
celebrities … [or] looking at dresses or people in the [news]paper … following some
crap on the telly’, activities that jar with the gravity of armed forces professionals.
More broadly, however, while misunderstanding of the distanced reservist role is
constitutive of an information vacuum often filled by soldierly stereotype, stigmatized
identities of the kinds discussed here are far from fixed, with reservists exercising subtle
forms of agency oriented towards shifting ‘civilian mindsets’ exemplified in deployment
to Iraq as flagged above. De Jordy (2008, 509) argues that ‘in the organisational setting,
the frequency, permanency and interdependence of actors moves them from a transac-
tional nature to a relational one’ where, according to Goffman (1963, 86), ‘every
relationship obliges the related persons to exchange an appropriate amount of intimate
facts about self, as evidence of trust and mutual commitment’. Acknowledging the
inevitable reservist/civilian interaction chimes with wider MoD imperatives to educate
the public through the vector of the reservist, as we see below, while also moving
beyond Goffman’s static formulation of power and the limited agency of the stigma-
tized. However, at other moments stigmatized identity might be essentialized and the
actor framed purely through the lens of the reservist role as so-called ‘master status’
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(Goffman 1963). To illustrate, in wishing to discuss the weekend’s training activities a
participant said, ‘I would have done something quite exciting and I wanted to share …
what I did… and I was met with a lot of mixed emotional feeling’. A number of civilian
colleagues even went so far as to ‘stop speaking’ to her, as well as – quite literally –
‘keeping their distance’ and ‘making judgements’. The more hostile members of this
cohort saw the participant’s reservist role as helping to explain ‘the way she was’ and
her ‘personality’ as key attributes of a master status.
Passing: facilitating proximity through humour
Recalling a well-known supermarket where he was previously employed, one reservist
discussed a common jibe whereby colleagues would say ‘Oh, Saturdays and Sundays
squad’s going out again … SAS they used to call us!’ He then went on to talk about the
acronym ‘SWAT’ and in seeking further clarification the interviewer was told that this
referred to ‘Some weekends and Thursdays’. Another reservist suggested that civilian work
colleagues ‘don’t really know much about it [reservist life] … they just think we’re off
playing soldiers… [by calling us] “little action men”’. He accepted that ‘getting ribbed’ for
his service was inevitable, and went on to say that ‘people are going to take the piss’.
Represented by colleagues in a gendered language that invoked a blend of farcical hyper-
masculinity (Rambo) on the one hand, and marginal masculinity (little action men) on the
other, these participants didn’t feel that their military masculinity was taken seriously. The
use of derogatory labels invites a second-class status, that can in turn lead to tensions and
demonstrates misunderstanding of the reservist (Kirke 2008, 10). On the face of it, current
findings signal reservists’ ability to negotiate the potentially undermining impact of these
framings through laughing them off or refusing to take them seriously (although they may
have little choice to do otherwise). These and numerous other less than flattering comments
made by colleagues amounted to being ridiculed at worst, or humoured and patronized at
best, in ways that parallel treatment of the character ‘Gareth’ in the BBC’s comedy show The
Office. Gareth felt that his role as a member of the TA was never fully appreciated and his
ability to achieve a militarized and masculinized form of gendered prowess was continually
undermined.2 As he notes on his (fictionalized) BBC webpage: ‘A lot of people think that
those in the Territorial Army are not real soldiers. We are. We are well trained, highly
disciplined fighting machines ready for war. We’re just not available during the week’.3
In a similar parodic manner and aimed with obvious delight at his audience, the British
stand-up comedian Jack Dee delivers the following line: ‘part-time solider – full time
banging on about it!’ and in a broader sense – as indicated – the reserve forces are often
referred to in the media as weekend warriors or Dad’s Army (Mervin 2005; Martin 2011).
Paradoxically, however, since these labels have also been integrated into popular culture
their ubiquitous use by both civilians and reservists may actually normalize the latter’s
‘military’ presence in the workplace. Humour provides colleagues with a degree of control
over reservists’ ‘otherness’ through the dualism of reservists’ simultaneous inclusion and
exclusion. This is informed by civilians’ tacit knowledge of popular cultural representations
invoking an exceptional status or ‘virtual social identity’ (Goffman 1963, 2). The identity is
contrasted with her or his actual social identity that ‘he could in fact be proved to possess’
(Goffman 1963, 2) and, as indicated above, one that could be cultivated by reservists
through ‘educating’ colleagues about what it is they do. Reservists’ virtual social identity
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both constrains and liberates their workplace interactional possibilities in relation to how a
discredited individual should act. In this way, colleagues set about ‘constructing a stigma
theory … an ideology to explain his [sic] inferiority … and account for the danger he
represents’. (Goffman 1963, 67). In another sense, the negotiation of humour by reservists
serves to normalize their identity in ways that ‘make their difference seem commonplace or
ordinary’ (Clair, Beatty, and Maclean 2005, 83) in order to facilitate workplace integration.
‘Tough Mudder’ and ‘camping’ as limiting distance?
Another way in which to render the experience of reserve service familiar and thereby
closer to civilian colleagues was for participants to stress its physically testing masculine
character as a potential point of convergence with some aspects of civilian life.4 Parodying
colleagues’ responses, one reservist said, ‘“Oh, look. There’s a person pushing their body to
the limit and doing extremely physical things”’. He went on to say that invoking fitness
may be familiar to work colleagues and function as a corrective to the more typical kind of
comment captured in the following ‘“Oh, look. There’s Phil [just] going off and … doing
some kind of weird soldiery [thing]”’. Another participant stressed the choice he made to
become a reservist that often exposed him to being ‘thrashed by an instructor or chucked
in cold water or lying in a ditch’. The challenge, if he so chose, was to ‘vocalise that’ to
civilians since ‘it’s a really difficult one to explain to somebody’. In a more specific sense,
participants reflected on the comparison they made with ‘Tough Mudder’ which is an 8-10
mile military style endurance event . Participants also stressed the corporeality of the
reservist role, involving activities that were carried out, in the words of one reservist, ‘not
because [we’re] some kind of poncey [sic] people who want to swim through mud to make
ourselves feel macho’, but rather ‘because the nature of the job demands that you are
physically fit like that’. A female reservist stated, ‘I can beat the majority of them [civilian
men] … so they won’t ask me to go to the gym with them’. Against the backdrop of what
was clearly a competitive civilian environment that reached beyond the office and into the
space of the gym, she went on to discuss the negative implications of this superior fitness
that meant she was excluded in other work-related contexts.
‘Becoming a civilian?’
A perspicuous example of the concealing of spoilt identity that can be attributed to a
reservist comes from a participant who was a student at a University in Northern Ireland;
although not a workplace example it is nonetheless illustrative. This reservist went to
extraordinary lengths to hide his military identity from a girlfriend. His story involves a
blend of subterfuge and quick thinking as integral to a conscious strategy of demilitarized
presentation of the stigmatized self. His somewhat extreme practices - perhaps exacerbated
by the politics of the regional context - reflect in-microcosm attempts by others in the
sample to control what they felt able to reveal about their military role to civilians in order
to facilitate inclusion and acceptance. The participant’s exemplary story is worth recounting
in some detail. He started by saying ‘in my room there is no military kit on show [or] in
drawers… but [it is kept in] walking bags’, social practice that speaks explicitly to amode of
concealment that involves ‘actively preventing others from learning personal information
that has the potential to reveal a stigmatised identity’ (Croteau, Anderson, and Bonnie 2008,
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541). He went on to say, ‘I was seeing this girl at the time’ and the evening that he invited
her to his room set in motion a series of actions oriented at preserving the secrecy of the
reservist life. In his room were two paintings ‘of me in military kit’ that he had won in a
competition, and having recalled the potential of these to shed light on his (secretive) role,
the participant stated ‘I ran upstairs and just threw them [the paintings] off the wall [sic]…
[I] smashed one of them doing it’. The reason he gave for this decisive act ‘was to sanitise
[the] place…make sure everything was away’ because, he recalled, ‘[she] didn’t know I was
in the army at all’. However, attempts to protect military identity did not end there. Hewent
on ‘I … left a bank statement out … she read [it] … the only real money coming in was
from HMG [Her Majesty’s Government]’. This posed a real challenge to the reservist who
was forced to ‘think on his feet’ as his ‘other’ life was about to become known to the female.
He told her that the letters ‘HMG’ on his statement referred to ‘a thing called the Hills and
Mountain Guides’, a paid position he spontaneously invented to divert her from the truth.
In providing false information, this participant created a new identity (Clair, Beatty, and
Maclean 2005, 89) in order to explain away ‘the boots and kit and maps’ vital for the
reservist role, and as the deception grew, it became increasingly difficult to divulge his ‘real’
identity as a member of the armed forces. The actions of this participant are worthy of brief
consideration in regard to the stress he appeared to experience in hiding his identity and its
corollary, deceiving his new partner. As Clair, Beatty, and Maclean (2005, 89) argue,
passers may experience psychological strain from feeling like a fraud … because of a need
to construct credible and consistent fabrications about their lives … ‘concealing a stigma
leads to an inner turmoil that is remarkable for its intensity and its capacity for absorbing
an individual’s mental life’. (Clair, Beatty, and Maclean 2005, 89)
One way in which to counter stigma-induced stress was through developing relation-
ships with military veterans or ‘kindred spirits’ in the workplace, as we now see.
Closing the distance with ‘wise others’
One of the more obvious predictors of favourable response discussed by our sample
turned on the biography of work colleagues – were they ex-forces or did they at least
profess to have some kind of tangible link to the institution? One participant recounted
his experiences thus: ‘when you find somebody who is ex-forces, or who has some sort
of forces connection you can instantly build a bond with them’. Prior to this comment,
he highlighted the very particular way in which a shared history configured interaction
in regard to ‘people in the military [who have a] “banter bug” … you speak to each
other differently … [we can be] risqué, it is completely open season with someone from
the military’. He went on to further personalize this possibility through invoking an ex-
RAF work colleague, whose background fostered an immediate connection. The parti-
cipant stated, ‘as soon as we realized [it felt as if] we had been friends for … a thousand
years … it’s not like a secret language or anything … but [it’s like] “ah thank God!”’.
This affinity, characterized in part by ‘the same sense of humour … and attitude about
getting things done … that was not politically correct ’, was presented as something of a
military oasis in a civilian desert otherwise ignorant of military subjectivities. A similar
experience was recounted in regard to the enduring importance of former military
identity. This point of commonality sparked genuine interest in his reservist role from
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former regulars ‘who were asking me questions all the time … they were older than me
… in their sixties … they loved to have a good crack about the army’. The desire for
seeking out others with shared backgrounds and experiences assumed a heightened
form for a number of reservists, not least since the durable social bonds fostered in
these interactions eased the tensions of their othered identity. Those with whom
personal information of the reserve role is shared are referred to by Goffman (1963)
as wise others. These individuals ‘seem knowledgeable about and sympathetic toward
the particular difference … [the stigmatized] seek out and prefer to interact with [them]
whom they believe support and validate their identity’ (Clair, Beatty, and Maclean
2005, 86).
In sum, these relationships mirror those between regular military personnel in that they
are maintained through ‘sharing experiences [and] reminiscing’ (Dandeker, Greenberg,
andOrme 2011, 352). Given the relative absence of reservists’ opportunities to connect with
other reservists in their workplace, it is perhaps unsurprising that they should be drawn to
ex-forces personnel who ‘know what it is all about and value it’ (Dandeker, Greenberg, and
Orme 2011, 352) in the form of veteran colleagues. In contrast, where work culture
assumed a distinctly civilian identity inculcated through many years of employment within
a specific corporate and boundedmilieu, reservists rapidly defaulted to a degree of reticence
in revealing their stigmatized role. One said, ‘the guys I worked with… at Flannigans5 were
apprentices who had been in post since leaving formal education’. He continued, ‘their
culture was Flannigans through and through … I was aware that no one was in … the
reserves’. Knowledge of the depth and tenacity of civilian work culture influenced the
choice to suppress reservist identity, or as he put it, ‘not feel the need’ to divulge the role. As
Clair, Beatty, and Maclean (2005, 84) argue, ‘organizational context influences the decision
to reveal [their stigma] as individuals assess the social norms of their workplace’; also, ‘the
support of … fellow [civilian] colleagues’ towards reservists ‘may be uneven in level and
kind’ (Dandeker et al. 2010, 276).
Discussion and Analysis
Our data has foregrounded the intersubjective dimensions of reservist agency in the form of
passing, elicited through the stigma imputed to them by colleagues in the civilian work
context. These interactions have played out against the backdrop of the informal elements
of FR2020 around the belief that once publics have been enlightened by reservists in the
workplace they will come to understand the value of the armed forces. In response to the
‘spoilt identities’ attributed to them, however, reservists developed various forms of passing
with the effect that their potential educative role has been significantly curtailed through
distancing from colleagues.6 Following from this, it appears that stigma prevents or limits
processes of militarization through discrediting, silencing, and distancing its potential
advocates who then revert to or seek solace in a non-threatening presence or, in the most
extreme of examples, a civilian identity. Seen in this light, their informal role in familiariz-
ing colleagues with the importance of the military and the militarist ideas shaping its
institutional culture meets tangible limits that fall short of the influence imagined by the
architects of FR2020. Further, it also appears that critical scholars who claim that FR2020 is
one element of the creeping militarization of British society do so with little regard to the
nuanced dynamics shaping reservists’ workplace presence. Their claims that reservists
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‘actively promote support for the military’ (Walton 2014, 9) are hardly borne out in our
findings. Taken together, then, the most obvious reading of these workplace dynamics is a
civil–military relationship characterized by stasis where reservists appear not to be outward
facing and processes of militarization fail to take root in the workplace.
Stigma and passing: militarization reconsidered
Yet, in paying careful attention to insights developed from within the militarization
literature through a critical reading of the everyday that require us to start with stigmatized
workplace interactions, we now reconsider the implications of reservists’ social tactic of
passing. This approach demands that we pay heed to the subtle dimensions of militariza-
tion, the influence of which is to be found in the productive tensions between the distance
and familiarity negotiated by reservists through passing. At the same time as they maintain
distance from an institution that is tasked, as we argue above, with the otherwise proscribed
act of taking life when ordered to do so, reservists experience the need for the wider public
to support them. In recent years the political calculations underpinning the emergence of
risk-transfer militarism (Shaw 2002) have brought into sharp relief armed forces’ depen-
dence on a robust degree of support without which overseas interventions are quickly
delegitimated (Shaw 1991; Gribble et al. 2014). As a new generation of military and civilian
elites have attempted to render the armed forces and their personnel ‘familiar, yet excep-
tional’ – a process more advanced in the US context through Catherine Lutz’s notion of the
‘military normal’ in the context of counterinsurgency warfare – so they have fallen foul of
the increasingly blurred lines between the two chimingwithHowell’s (2018)martial politics
that stresses the indivisibility of the civilian and military spheres. Whereas over-familiarity
can engender a reluctance to put troops in harm’s way as they are celebrated as actors of
particular sacrificial kinds, human and known, rather than mythologized (King 2010), too
much distance may render the armed forces beyond routine familiarity and, as it slips from
view, an institution of potential irrelevance. It is by conceiving of the nexus linking stigma
with passing as a normalizing move, however, that we are able to bring the productive
dimensions of distance and familiarity into view. Following from this, we argue that
reservists’ presence in the workplace assumes a far greater militarizing influence than
might be thought at first blush. This is because their role as members of the armed forces
and the attitudes, beliefs, and social practices embodied therein (Mann 1987; Shaw 1991, 3;
Basham and Gifkins 2015), while suppressed and at times belittled and at others neutra-
lized, nonetheless prevail with relatively little challenge from colleagues. The use of humour,
invocations of familiarity through the physicality of ‘ToughMudder’ and the seeking out of
‘wise others’ spontaneously emerged in ways that engendered a ‘passing with’ colleagues,
whereas the individual who fabricated his identity attempted to ‘pass by’ his girlfriend. In
‘passing with’, a manageable sense of self that balances both familiarity and distance
emerges, whereas the process of ‘passing by’ renders ontologically insecure a reservist
who has perhaps distanced himself excessively from a key actor in his social milieu. The
key point here in regard to the fecund relationship between distance and familiarity is that
reservists who might otherwise support, promote, or even celebrate their militarized role if
they were not stigmatized, and in turn stimulate potential contestation from those collea-
gues wary of an organization that uses violence, are consequently deprived of the oppor-
tunity to do so because of their questionable military identity. Devoid of the reservist foil
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with whom open and frank discussion might take place around the armed forces and the
legitimacy of the militarist values upon which it depends, these actors reflexively position
themselves, and are positioned by others, as somewhat apathetic to their voluntary role.
This apathy can bleed into a qualified sense of cynicism by reservist and civilian alike
towards the military in ways that downplay rather than actively engage the military’s role,
and the extent to which it has attained a heightened presence in everyday life. Here,
colleagues’ perceptions of reservists play out through liberal (Basham 2018) and ideological
narratives (Eastwood 2018) where responses to the military may not ‘take the form of an
enthusiastic love … [but rather can be] ambiguous, even involuntary or unconscious’
(Eastwood 2018, 48) though remaining shot through with militarizing logics.
The militarist dividend
While stigma appears to flow from colleagues’ relative ambivalence to their reservist peers, it
may also be that largely unacknowledged interests in the form of what we call the militarist
dividend play a part in civilians’ existential motivations to distance, yet render familiar,
reservist peers. Developed from Raewyn Connell’s (1995) concept of the patriarchal divi-
dend where complicit masculinities’ acquiescence towards prevailing power regimes sup-
ports the gendered (patriarchal/fratriarchal) status quo, is the militarist dividend that signals
colleagues’ simultaneous wariness towards and gratitude for the armed forces. Like the
patriarchal dividend, this stance also involves a form of collusion, in this instance of the
militarist status quo, where acceptance of the political implications of reservist presence is
left largely unspoken. While ostensibly uninvested in the militarist discourse, it is through
stigma as qualified resistance that colleagues reap the perceived benefits of the military as
(apparent) guarantor of national security. As beneficiaries of the militarist (security) divi-
dend symbolized by the institution and its members, colleagues’ use of stigma helps
maintain the status quo where the armed forces remain largely unquestioned. One way to
read their ambivalence towards the military is to see it as flowing from ‘fear and feelings of
insecurity [that] facilitate conditions in which military action can be actively supported,
opposed and ignored all at once, but normalized nonetheless’ (Basham 2018, 34).
As we have seen, stigma distances civilian from reservist and reflects in microcosm
one of the ways in which violence can be disassociated from politics in a liberal
militarist context (Basham 2018). Taken together, the broader implications of the
mundane workplace interactional practices discussed above are considerable since
they remind us that militarism is ‘not antithetical to the norm’, as demonstrated in
the social context of civilian employment, for example (Basham 2018, 33, emphasis
added). Whether reservists are attempting to enlighten colleagues about the armed
forces or not, the politics of security are nonetheless embodied within the individual
volunteer by virtue of his or her military status (Hyndman 2004; Kuus 2009, 548). Seen
in this way, and attuned to the productive dimensions of passivity, reservists are vectors
of militarization that depend on subtle, at times explicit and yet contingent configura-
tions of normalized, diffuse, and hidden power that may itself appear wholly benign. As
Eastwood (2018, 48) argues in reference to participation in war and military activity in
the widest sense, ‘of course it includes the work of soldiers … [but] can even be
extended to passive acceptance or acquiescence in war’. In passing as banal and
unexceptional in their liminal, and at times obfuscated, stigmatized military subjectivity
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(Baaz and Verweijen 2016), without these actors the institution would cease to exist in
its current and future expanded form, given the aims of FR2020. A note of caution is
warranted, however. Militarization is an unintended consequence of stigma that ema-
nates not from reservists’ calculated instrumentality to skilfully promote particular
kinds of militarist agenda through its normalization, but rather from altogether more
prosaic attempts to manage a spoilt identity in the workplace. In sum, it is by paying
attention to the quotidian that we are able to grasp the ‘mobile, processual and
transformative’ dimensions of militarization (Hyde 2016, 864) made possible by the
nexus linking reservist proximity/distance with the stigma/passing it facilitates.
Finally, in keeping with the acute sensitivity of critical scholars who stress the
importance of the mundane and apparently innocuous context of everyday social
relations, our focus has been on particular kinds of workplace interactions through
which processes of militarization come to the fore in inconsistent and surprising
ways. Our analysis foregrounds the inadvertent dimensions of militarization, the
influence of which should be grappled with in the same manner as more explicit
attempts to instil military values in civilians as discussed in the examination of
tactics employed by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, to take one example
(Kuus 2009). Ultimately, this paper directs attention to sociological and psycho-
analytic processes that may well lie beyond the immediate grasp of the actors
involved, and for whom their negotiation of militarization and the militarist ideas
it embodies come to influence the non-discursive realm (Giddens 1994). Our hope
is that the current contribution paves the way for analysis attuned to the subtleties
of militarization in the form of the reservists who continue to play an important
role in the British context where the absent presence of war-like relations demands
close attention.
Notes
1. It is our contention that militarization is inflected with regional difference to which
much scholarship is insensitive. To talk of ‘UK’ or ‘British militarization’ is to conflate
the political-defence dynamics and associated public opinion in Scotland, Wales, and
England. For example, the nationalist political parties in Scotland (The Scottish National
Party) and in Wales (Plaid Cymru) have both called for the Trident ‘nuclear deterrent’ to
be scrapped. Second, and speaking directly to the rigour of the claims we make here,
data has been generated solely from the English context.
2. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AlFkHTNiycU, accessed 31 August 2018.
3. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/comedy/theoffice/gareth/, accessed 31 August 2018.
4. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tough_Mudder, accessed 31 August 2018. Tough Mudder
is supported by the charity Help for Heroes, and when analysed through the imagery by
which it is promoted on its own website, has obvious similarity to the militarized aesthetic of
physical challenge, suffering, and competition.
5. The name of this company has been changed for reasons of anonymity.
6. The line of argument developed in this paper gives rise to both a puzzle and a question. In
respect of the latter, we might ask how far and in what kinds of ways – if at all – the public
role of the reservist as a member of a taxpayer-funded institution should be disclosed to
civilian co-workers. With this in mind is the puzzle that a number of our reservists felt
unable to disclose their identity even though they are typically presented as revered and
respected members of a national institution.
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